Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Paolo Coccorese 
Author-X-Name-First: Paolo 
Author-X-Name-Last: Coccorese
Author-Email: coccorese@unisa.it
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Salerno
Author-Name: Giovanni Ferri 
Author-X-Name-First: Giovanni
Author-X-Name-Last: Ferri
Author-Email: g.ferri@lumsa.it
Author-Workplace-Name: LUMSA University 
Title: Is Competition Among Cooperative Banks a Negative Sum Game?

Abstract: Does ‘inner’ competition – rivalry among network members – worsen performance in a network of cooperative banks? Inner competition might, in fact, endanger network-dependent scale economies. We test our hypothesis on Banche di Credito Cooperativo (BCCs), Italy’s network of mutual cooperative banks. We find a worsening of performance both at incumbent and (even more) at aggressor BCCs when they compete among themselves. Instead, the worsening is mild when BCCs compete with non-BCC comparable banks. We conclude that inner competition among cooperative banks is a negative sum game and, thus, limiting it would be desirable to preserve the stability of cooperative banking networks. 
Length: 40 pages
Creation-Date: 2017-03
Publication-Status: 
File-URL: https://repec.lumsa.it/wp/wpC19.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
Number: wpC19
Classification-JEL: D47, G21, G34
Keywords: Cooperative Banks, Rivalry Among Network Members, Strategic Interactions, Negative Sum Game, Banking Network
Handle: RePEc:lsa:wpaper:wpC19