Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Marcus Giamattei Author-X-Name-First: Marcus Author-X-Name-Last: Giamattei Author-Email: m.giamattei@fs.de Author-Workplace-Name: Frankfurt School of Finance and Management Author-Name: Pierfrancesco Alaimo di Loro Author-X-Name-First: Pierfrancesco Author-X-Name-Last: Alaimo di Loro Author-Email: p.alaimodiloro@lumsa.it Author-Workplace-Name: LUMSA University, Rome, Italy; HURfuture Research Center Author-Name: Matteo Rizzolli Author-X-Name-First: Matteo Author-X-Name-Last: Rizzolli Author-Email: m.rizzolli@lumsa.it Author-Workplace-Name: GEPLI Department, LUMSA University, Rome, Italy; HURfuture Research Center Author-Name: Stefan Voigt Author-X-Name-First: Stefan Author-X-Name-Last: Voigt Author-Email: stefan.voigt@uni-hamburg.de Author-Workplace-Name: Hamburg University Title: Testing Ten Stylized Facts About Public Goods Games. A Large-Scale Replication Using Classroom Data Abstract: We test the replicability of ten stylized facts about voluntary contributions to public goods using a large crowd-sourced dataset of classroom experiments on the classEx platform. Our sample comprises 81,391 contribution decisions by 10,891 players across 377 sessions in 16 countries (2019-2025). Five facts replicate: initial contributions above Nash (37.6% of endowment), non-zero final-round contributions (38.7%), conditional cooperation as the modal behavioral type, imperfect matching, and cross-country heterogeneity. One is partially confirmed (a modest end-game effect) and one is weakly supported (a positive MPCR effect, sensitive to country fixed effects). Three do not replicate. Contributions follow a hump-shaped trajectory - rising through round 5, plateauing, then gently declining - rather than the canonical decline. Only 34.4% of players free-ride in the final round (vs. the laboratory benchmark of over 70%), while a substantial minority (22.1%) sustain full cooperation. Societal indicators do not predict country-level cooperation, partly because cross-country variation explains only 0.8% of individual contribution variance - an order of magnitude less than organization-level heterogeneity (6.8%). Taken together, the canonical behavioral building blocks of the public goods game reproduce in the classroom, whereas several of its dynamic and cross-country regularities - most notably the absence of the canonical decline - do not. (Includes Online Appendix with experimental interface and additional figures.) Note: Author order is certified random, as described by Ray and Robson (2018); see https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/random-author-order. Length: 48 pages Creation-Date: 2026-09 Publication-Status: File-URL: https://repec.lumsa.it/wp/wphurf05.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf Number: wphurf05 Classification-JEL: C91; C92; D70; H41 Keywords: Public goods game; Cooperation; Replication; Classroom experiments; ClassEx; Conditional cooperation Handle: RePEc:lsa:wphurf:wphurf05